Monday, February 24, 2003: A Terrorist Manufactured by Secret Agents
Sorin Ozon, Stefan Candea
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Military
Unit (MU) 0962 destroyed the life of a Romanian
In November 2002, the unit headed by general Ardeleanu set Europe ablaze, grounding
their allegation on a .reliable source.. In fact, the reliable source was an
anony-mous letter. The victim: Florin Padure, a Romanian established in Leipzig.
Suspected of planning to sabotage the Prague Summit, the man was shadowed by
the Germans, but found not guilty. The clumsiness of the Direction for Information
Protection within the Home Affairs Ministry triggered an international spy operation.
The target: Florin Padure, a Romanian citizen established in Germany. In keeping
with the documents issued by the above-mentioned department, Padure would have
intended to sabotage the NATO Summit in Prague. Romanian playwright Ion Luca
Caragiale wrote, more than a century ago: .One needs to have my guts to sign
it, so we will send an anonymous letter!. Who could have guessed however, that
nowa- days, the celebrated assertion would accu- rately describe the working
system of the Romanian secret services? The following lines provide details
on a secret operation of the Romanian infor- mation services . an operation
that set ablaze, without reason, the authorities of several countries . as well
as on the way, 13 years after the Revolution, the Romanian authorities still
chase .terror-ists. outside the country.s borders.
Padure, the terrorist
Padure
is a 33-year-old Romanian citizen who has lived since 1995 in the German town
of Leipzig. Until recently, Padure was one of the many Romanians who defected
to Western Europe for a better life. He obtained a job in Germany and even married
a German. Life seemed to have reached normality in what the young Romanian was
concerned.
By the end of last year, though, everything changed radically. In November 2002,
Padure was one of the most wanted on the German territory. For 10 days, each
step Padure took was monitored and recorded by German authorities, within a
wide ranging pursuit and surveillance action. The reason of it? Padure was sus-
pected at the time of intending to organize and lead a terrorist group! Consequently,
his telephone calls were taped, and every step our Romanian fellow made, was
filmed and photographed. All the persons that contacted him during this period
were in turn kept under surveillance, and some of them interviewed. The operative
monitoring the subject of which was Padure was concluded as of the evening of
November 21, even before the NATO Summit in Prague, where Romania was invited
to accede as an ally.
Target: NATO Summit in Prague
This is Padure.s story, told by himself. .The German police notified me, as
of the beginning of December, that I was a suspect for organizing a terrorist
network, made up of Romanians established in the West, whose target was undermining
the NATO Summit in Prague, through violet actions. I also found out that I was
believed to organize several self-settings on fire in front of official buildings.
.All these accusations came from Romania, through the intermediary of the Romanian
Embassy in Prague. The German authorities followed me day in, day out, followed
on the heels of my friends and interviewed my superiors at work. .Now, when
everything is over, they realize the have wasted their time. As for myself,
I am left with huge problems on my plate. My wife does no more know what to
believe, my friends glance suspiciously at me. .At the office, they told me
my contract would not be extended, so I am out of work. My boss told me that
he had no more work for me, but I know he did. And I also know that he was questioned
about me and he did not want to have troubles because of me. .Even if now the
matter is cleared up, the very suspicion that I might deal with such a thing
scares the wits out of them. Here, after September 11, 2001, people became very
sensitive about anything that may relate to terrorism. Practically, my life
was destroyed due to steps decided in Romania.
Dealt with by Romanians
I confronted Padure.s story with the official documents held by Saxony Land
Police. These documents show that as of November 8, the Land police received,
from the examining magistrate, a mandate to perform a long term monitoring on
Padure, allowing for the use of hidden operative technique (audio, video, etc.)
The mandate expired on November 22. The monitoring began on November 10, at
12.15 hours and ended on November 21, at 20.30. The decision made by the examining
magistrate was grounded on the existence of information provided by the Romanian
Ministry for Home Affairs (MHA), concerning Padure.s intention to organize violent
protests during the Summit in Prague. So, the sole information used by German
authorities was the data provided by the Romanian Ministry for Home Affairs
that described their informer as a very reliable source. Confident in the Romanian
source, considered very reliable by the officials in Bucharest, the Germans
of the Criminology Office of Saxony Land made one more additional check: the
acknowledgement of Padure.s address. The judge mentioned that, since this first
item of information coming from the Romanians was confirmed, then all initial
information could be true. Furthermore, the judge showed concern for a possible
threat to other persons, which explains a long term monitoring and, implicitly,
the restriction of Padure.s rights. Before reaching the German authorities,
the information on Padure, coming from Romania, transited the Directionfor International
Relationships within the MHA and also the Romanian Embassy in Prague. On September
12, 2002, the liaison officer of the MHA within the Embassy forwarded the data
received to the Head of the Czech Police. Though during our telephone conversation,
Valentin Balan, the liaison officer in Prague, would not admit it, the official
documents showed that a formal contact between the Romanian and the Czech parties
was established as of September 12, 2002. The German authorities shadowed me
day in, day out, followed on the heels of my friends and interviewed my superiors
at the work place. Now they realize themselves that they wasted their time.
Myself though, I am left with huge problems on my plate. said Padure.
The MHA Conclusion: Padure was unhappy
After having received the anonymous letter, the staff protection entitywithin
the MHA set to work. After only five days, enough data were collected at Bucharest,
which . in the opinion of the Romanian authorities . would justify a minute
research in Neamt district, the Padure.s native place. When the research performed
by the authorities in Neamt was concluded, they sent, in July 11, a reply to
Bucharest, mentioning that Padure was away from the country for several years,
being established in Germany. Furthermore, the officers in Neamt wrote that
the suspect would have certain .dissatisfactions.
Correction:”.The international political context”
The alert Officer of MU 0962 would not bother to mention the kind of dissatisfactions
Padure experienced. The fact is that Bucharest authorities decided to forward
these data to the Czech Police. On September 12, the head of this body received
the information from the Romanian liaison officer. One month later, the Criminality
Department of Saxony Land ceaselessly monitored Padure. MU 0962 practically
found no information on Padure that would confirm the fact that the anonymous
letter contained coherent data.
But . the officers would say . .the international political context within which
the letter was sent. made consideration of such mandatory. More serious, though,
is the fact that the Czech Police and the German authorities were assured by
the Romanian party that the MHA informer .is always reliable.. Which meant the
MHA were aware of the informer.s identity and also that they had previously
collaborated with him.
However, what neither the Germans nor the Czechs knew was the fact that the
socalled informer was an anonymous letter. Following this lead, we found out
the internal protection office of the MHA (the ex MU 0215, also called .a quarter
past two.) opened an informative supervision brief on the name of Padure, as
early as June 27, 2002. LEADS: The information grounding the opening of this
brief is comprised in an anonymous later, sent to the address of the MHA in
Bucharest, more precisely, to the attention of Minister Ioan Rus. The letter
was signed by .a group of revolutionaries. and drawn up by a person used to
police paper work. The one who wrote it set a several centimeters wide standard
left margin, and drew it up on two separate leaves, and not on a front and back
leaf. The very way they would do it for statements or notes attached to police
briefs.
DANGEROUS.
The letter unmasked Padure in a “communist comrade” way.
He is said to .have abandoned the ideals of the December .89 Revolution. and
wished to prevent Romania from acceding to the NATO. It is also said that Padure
had certain dissatisfactions, which he displayed publicly, and that he had been
an active participant in the Revolution. Furthermore, the letter mentioned that
he had bragged about holding a series of video cassettes taken during the Revolution,
which could compromise important personalities, had they been sent to the media.
ANTI-NATO. The letter contains all the information that reached the German authorities,
on the violent protests, on the organization of a group of Romanians established
in the West, on the fact that Padure would lead this group and would have persuaded
several followers to set themselves on fire in Prague, during the Summit. THE
GEAR. It seams incredible, but the information contained in an anonymous letter
that reached the MU 0962, the secret service of the MHA . the ex .two and a
quarter. . set in motion an infernal gear, involving several secret services,
police offices in several countries, supervision technique, etc. To say nothing
of the German taxpayer.s money, wasted to finance a wide scale surveillance
process, carried out for 11 days on a row.
An internal office with international powers?
The involvement of MU 0962 in a case having international ramifications is at
least suspect, and goes beyond the competences of the secret service within
the MHA. Practically, the MU 0962 was established in January 1990, upon initiative
of Gelu Voican Voiculescu, Vice prime minister of Petre Roman Administration.
At the time, 400 officers of Directorate IV within State Security Direction
and of the DSS Bucharest, were grouped under the denomination of MU 0215. Better
known under the name .two and a quarter., the unit.s object was to protect the
officers of the Ministry for Home Affairs. The command of .two and a quarter.
was ensured by a series of ex Security officers and controversial characters.
Among these, we would mention Florin Calapod, one of the heads of 0215, who
later went into business and sold Viagra on the Internet. In 1999, under the
command of general Ardeleanu, the office was reformed and became MU 0962. Besides
the competences to protect officers, the new office was also empowered to collect
information on the internal market.